At that time I described the situation in the two texts as follows:
Manu may have known writing. However, written documents of any kind did not play any role in its juridical system. Contrary to the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra he doesn't even refer to written legal procedure. (…) Out of the later trividhapramāṇas juridical authority is attributed only to witnesses and possession. This should not to be taken to mean that private documents did not exist, nor that they were not used in practical law at the time when these texts were composed. But the codified law as represented here takes no notice of them. (…) These two texts represent a state of ancient Indian law in which writing as well as written public documents were known. In the sphere of civil law, however, written documents apparently did not play a significant role (Strauch 2002: 34-35) .
This brief essay is not the place to address the entire issue. In fact, this is not even necessary. If we look at the relevant passages in both texts, there is apparently only a single word that determines the validity of my evaluation: deśa.
3 It was recognized quite early that there are passages in the Arthaśāstra and in Dharmaśāstra texts where this term cannot be translated in its conventional meaning "place, region", but has to be conceived as a specific legal term. I therefore want to use this article to summarize what we know about this word in the context of early legal terminology and to determine whether this knowledge really helps us to settle the question about written documents in civil law and legal procedure.
Manu and Kauṭilya : Śāstric intertextuality
In the Mānava Dharmaśāstra deśa occurs only in the following passage: since at least for many of our colleagues German has ceased to be a language that is commonly perceived as a medium of academic communication, I decided to repeat some of my previous arguments and to confront them with Olivelle's recent interpretations. For making this discussion accessible to a wider audience, I use the English language. For the same reason, quotations from my work will also be translated into English. I use this opportunity to thank Richard Salomon (Seattle) who took the trouble to check the English of this paper. 3 For a discussion of karaṇa, another potential candidate for the meaning "written document" in the Mānava Dharmaśāstra and the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra, see Strauch 2002 : 34-34. Following Kangle, Olivelle translates karaṇa in KA 3.1.16 as "document" (2013 , but he remarks in his notes (2013: 584-585) that the "last transaction [karaṇa] " is considered as valid. This latter interpretation of karaṇa as "transaction, legal act" is certainly preferable here (Strauch 2002: 32-33 The term lekhya for a document produced as evidence, a term that becomes standard in later dharma texts, is not found either in the AŚ (= Arthaśāstra, I.S.) or Manu within the context of judicial proceedings, even though the AŚ uses the term for other kinds of writings. The conclusion then is that deśa was an old term for a document produced in court of law, possible related to diś in the sense of pointing out … (Olivelle 2004: 285 The man casts aside the plaint as recorded and moves on to another plaint; does not make a point made subsequently accord with what was stated previously; after challenging an unchallengeable statement of the opponent, remains obstinate; promises to produce a document (deśa), but when told, "Produce it," does not produce it, or produces a defective document (hīnadeśa) or something that does not constitute a documentary evidence (adeśa); puts forward a document (deśa) different from the document (deśa) specified; denies a significant statement in the document (deśa) he has put forward, saying "It is not so"; does not accept what has been ascertained through witnesses; secretly carries on a discussion with witnesses with regard to a document (deśa) that is prohibited from being discussed -these are the reasons for loss of suit (Olivelle 2013: 180-181, Skt . terms my addition).
Both passages would thus witness a rather advanced stage of development in the history of Indian diplomatics, in which the authority of written documents in legal procedure is generally acknowledged. Initially unnoticed by Olivelle -but referred to in his 2013 translation of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra (Olivelle 2013: 585-586) -was the quite similar attempt by Samozvancev who already in 1978 wrote a long article in which he tried to show that deśa in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra means "document".
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Although their individual arguments differ, 6 both scholars share the same conviction: Since documents are not referred to in either of these two texts in the context of legal procedures by their conventional terms such as lekha, likhita or lekhya, they must be hidden under an obscure terminology which has to be uncovered by the diligent philologist. This conviction is based on the assumption that the theory of the trividhapramāṇa was somehow a latent system that underlay the Indian legal procedure from the very beginning of its attestation.
Manu uses the term deśa only in this single passage. Whether and how he understood it is difficult to say. The terminology of this passage is strange in comparison with the rest of the text, and its commentators -as well as modern translators -have clearly had problems in interpreting it.
If we look at the commentators, none of them understood deśa or its combinations as "document"; evidently, the meaning of this term was less than clear to them. Nonetheless, they hesitated to introduce into this context a well-known institution that was otherwise lacking in Manu's exposition of a legal procedure. As shown by Olivelle (2004: 283-284) , they either replaced the somewhat obscure deśa by deśya and interpreted the latter as "witness who was present/at the spot", or they understood deśa in its common sense as "place", 7 indicating that the plaintiff would have to indicate the transaction's location. Bhāruci (ca. 8th c. CE), who was the earliest commentator on Manu and who was well acquainted with the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra or a closely related Artha text (Derrett 1965 , Trautmann 1971 , knows both readings. The term deśa he perceives as a statement that has to include the place and time of the acquisition, as well as the witnesses' testimony to prove it. The variant reading deśya he explains as deṣṭavyaṃ yathā gr̥hītaṃ kathayet "to be indicated: he should tell how it was obtained". Only for karaṇa in Manu's text -a term that was used in later Dharmaśāstras and in medieval times to designate a kind of written document -does Bhāruci consider a link to written documents (ed. Derrett 1975,1: 96-97; tr. Derrett 1975,2: 109-110) . He clearly states that deśa has to be regarded here as the more general term that also comprises karaṇa: "And so even the word 'place' (deśa) is intended to imply the 'proof' (karaṇa)" (tr. Derrett 1975,2: 109) . 8 In none of his explanations does he confine the meaning of deśa to "document". Olivelle 5 Samozvancev repeated his arguments in several articles (1981, 1984) , some of them also published in English (1980 English ( /81, 1982 ). 6 For a detailed criticism of Samozvancev's arguments see my discussion of deśa in Strauch 2002: 24-30. 7 According to Olivelle (2004: 284) , the connotation "place" was chosen by Bhāruci, Sarvajña-Nārāyaṇa and Nandana. Medhātithi, Govindarāja, Kullūka, Rāghavānanda, Rāmacandra and Maṇirāma understood deśa/deśya as "witness". Modern translations of this passage normally use one of these options. Cf. e. g. Bühler 1886: 263: "(a witness) who was present" for deśyaṃ in 8.52, "a witness not present at the transaction" for adeśaṃ in 8.53 and "in a place" for deśe in 8.55. Burnell consistently renders deśa as "place" for: "point out the place (where the debt was contracted)" (8:52), "an impossible place" (8:53) and "in a place" (8.55) (Burnell 1884: 185-186) . 8 Bhāruci's interpretation is based on his reading karaṇaṃ vā samuddiśet that is also found in a number of manuscripts. Part of the difficulty in translating this verse is due to the different renderings of this pāda and the ambiguous relationship of the terms deśa and karaṇa.
attributes this inconsistency to Bhāruci's ignorance of the "precise meaning of technical terms such as deśa for a legal document" (2013: 52). It is obvious that none of these explanations and translations is completely satisfactory. This situation is completely understandable when we consider this passage as a rather uncritical incorporation of textual material from another tradition. Therefore Olivelle is doubtlessly right in pointing to the necessity of interpreting this term on the basis of its use in the Arthaśāstra, from which this passage was obviously imported and where we should expect a more consistent use of terminology. For this purpose it is necessary to go beyond the limited evidence of the single passage (KA 3.1.19) quoted above and to expand the scope of our investigation at least to the juridical chapters of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra (adhikaraṇas 3 and 4) in their entirety. There we find many more occurrences of the term deśa which might help to reveal its terminological meaning in the Arthaśāstra.
Deśa and the right of ownership in the Arthaśāstra
Meyer in his admirable German translation of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra already recognized that it is not possible to translate deśa consistently in the 3rd and 4th adhikaraṇa, and proposed the meanings "Entscheidungspunkt, Beweisstück, Beweismittel" (1926: 957) .
9 Similarly, R.P. Kangle suggested "evidence, proof" (1969, 1: 313) , although he also considered a possible secondary "proof of ownership, title". As I have shown (Strauch 2002: 25-26) , this latter rather specific interpretation is contradictory and should be given up in favour of the more generic "evidence, proof". However, both passages where deśa has to be understood, according to Kangle, in this more specific sense of "proof of ownership, title" form a suitable starting point for our discussion. They are part of the exposition the right of ownership and have to be placed against this background.
The first of these passages (3.16.29) runs as follows:
svasvāmisambandhas tu -bhogānuvr̥ttir ucchinnadeśānāṃ yathāsvaṃ dravyāṇām (ed. Kangle 1969, my emphasis) Fortlaufender Besitz gilt für Sachen, bei denen die Beweispunkte weggefallen sind, als gleichwertig dem Eigentumsrecht (Meyer 1926 : 300, my emphasis).
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In accordance with his understanding of deśa Olivelle (2013: 215, my emphasis) translates:
With reference to the relation between owner and his property, however -for assets to which the documentary evidence has been lost, their continuous enjoyment establishes the respective ownership.
The second passage that concerns us here is found in the fourth adhikaraṇa (KA 4.6.9):
9 Cf. also Jolly, who translated hīnadeśam adeśaṃ vā nirdiśati in KA 3.1.19 as "er gibt den Streitpunkt zu niedrig oder falsch an" (1917: 232 = 2012: 925) . 10 Unfortunately, this passage is left untranslated by Kangle (1972) . Cf. also the Russian translation by A.A. Vigasin: "esli (drugie) dokazatel'stva utračeny" ("if [other] pieces of evidence are lost") (Vigasin & Samozvancev 1984: 82) . Kal'yanov's translation (1993: 207) "dlja lic pokinuvšix dannoe mesto" ("for persons who had left the respective place") is completely off the point. If the person who lost the article were also to prove the same, he shall hold the article as belonging to him whose possession of it was earlier and long or whose title is clear (Kangle 1972: 270, my emphasis) .
Wenn es sich um einen handelt, der etwas verloren hat, soll er ebendasselbe nachweisen.
Wer vorher und lange fort im Besitz (des betreffenden Gegenstandes) gewesen ist oder wessen Angabe makellos ist, 11 dem gehört der Gegenstand. So soll er (der Richter) es ansehen (Meyer 1926 : 335-336 , my emphasis).
Although in his Russian translation of the Arthaśāstra Kal'yanov is not really consistent in the rendering of deśa, he gives here: "čestnye svidetel'skie pokazanija", "honest testimony of witnesses" (Kal'yanov 1993: 236) .
Again Olivelle's translation has a different interpretation of deśa:
If the person who lost the article were to establish the same, he should recognize that the article belongs to the person who possessed it first and longer, or who has a valid document of title (Olivelle 2005: 235-236, my emphasis) .
But is such a rather specific understanding of deśa really possible in these two cases? Both Kangle's "title" and Olivelle's "document of title" show that they consider deśa to be associated with the concept of the "title of ownership". Both passages deal with different aspects of the law of ownership. In ancient Indian law, legal ownership is established by a title. The Sanskrit term used here is āgama, and makes clear that the legal appropriation of an object (by donation, inheritance, purchase) presupposes legal ownership. It is a general opinion in Dharmaśāstras that possession without a title (āgama) cannot establish legal ownership. However, in cases where the title cannot be proven by evidence, although the object was legally acquired (even if that cannot be proven anymore), uninterrupted possession can result in legal ownership. This is obviously this situation addressed by the first of these two passages, KA 3.16.29, introducing a chapter that describes the conditions under which the uninterrupted possession of an object can result in a title of ownership (usucaption). Accordingly, ucchinnadeśa describes a situation when the proof (of a title) can no longer be procured. If we were to translate deśa here as "documentary evidence", this would clearly rule out any other kind of evidence that could be procured by the original owner to prove his case. The understanding of this expression therefore has to rely on the Arthaśāstra's definition of the title and the ways in which it can be proven.
This leads us directly to the second passage quoted above. Here the text addresses another type of unclear ownership and describes the procedure in the case of lost property. In explaining how the owner can prove his legal title on the object in question, the text says (KA 4.6.7-4.6.10): If he comes across the reported article he should ask the man arrested with the article about his legal title to it, saying, "Where did you get this?" If he were to say, "I obtained it through inheritance. I received it -bought it, got it made, received it secretly as a pledge -from that individual. This is the place and the time of its acquisition. These are its price, size, distinguishing marks, and value," he should be released when his legal title to it has been substantiated. If the person who lost the article were to establish the same, he should recognize that the article belongs to the person who possessed it first and longer, or who has a valid document of title; for even among quadrupeds and bipeds, there is a similarity in appearance and distinguishing marks -how much more among forest produce, ornaments, and wares produced with material from the same source and by the same manufacturer (Olivelle 2005: 235-236 , my emphasis).
The passage makes it clear that the title (āgama) depends, first, on the plausible indication of the mode of appropriation, and second, on the correct statements about the specific features of the object in question. If both parties give this information, the decision is then to be made on the basis either of the criteria of possession (paribhoga) or of suci deśa. In my opinion, suci deśa can here only be interpreted in the sense of "clear evidence," including the testimony of witnesses who were able to confirm the statements made above, and any other indications that support the statements made by both parties. The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra's following reference to the problems of identifying an object as someone's property could indicate that here deśa has to be understood in a more general sense, i. e. as referring to statements that clearly prove the ownership of one person by indicating specific and distinct features of this object. Such an interpretation is also favoured by Manu's rendering of the same situation (8.31-32) A man who claims "This is mine" and, when questioned according to the rule, identifies its physical appearances, number, and the like correctly, is the owner and deserves to have that property; but if he is ignorant of the exact place and time when it was lost and its color, physical appearance, and size, he deserves a fine equal in value to that property (tr. Olivelle 2005: 168).
As we have seen, in both cases it is rather difficult to limit the semantic scope of deśa to "document" without neglecting the context of the legal system. These difficulties are also obvious if we consult a third passage of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra that describes a very similar case within the sphere of the right of ownership. The topic of this passage is asvāmivikraya "unauthorized sale", one of the traditional eighteen vyavahārapadas "titles of law." As in the passage quoted above, the legal title of ownership has to be proven by an indication of the legal acquisition. The question is again: kutas te labdham "From where did you get it?" and thus refers directly to the legal title (āgama). The present holder of the object is then asked to indicate the circumstances of the sale, and in particular the seller of the object. There is no mention of a written document in this procedure. If in Kauṭilya's legal system a document would be required to prove the title, it should have been mentioned here. Instead, the text uses the term karaṇa "proof". It says If we compare this phrase with the passages discussed above, it is obvious that the rather generic svakaraṇaṃ kr̥tvā corresponds to the phrase yasya pūrvo dīrghaś ca paribhogaḥ śucir vā deśas. The equation of both passages completely matches with the legal principle according to which either uninterrupted possession or clear evidence (for ownership) establish the right of ownership.
Back to intertextuality: the Arthaśāstra and Dharmaśāstric strategies of interpretation
The Yājñavalkya-Smr̥ti's treatment of the vyavahārapada "asvāmivikraya" seems to be largely indebted to the Arthaśāstra or to a closely related text (cf. Jolly 1913 Jolly : 74 = 2012 . Yājñavalkya renders the passage in question as:
āgamenopabhogena naṣṭaṃ bhāvyam ato 'nyathā / pañcabandho damas tasya rājñe tenāvibhāvite // 2.171
The (ownership of something that has been) lost is to be proven by title (and) possession, not otherwise. If he cannot prove it to the king, his fine is one-fifth.
Yājñavalkya-Smr̥ti here paraphrases the generic svakaraṇaṃ kr̥tvā of the Arthaśāstra passage by the more specific explanation that the right of ownership is based on two principles: title based on legal acquisition (āgama) and possession of the object (upabhoga). This is not exactly the same as what is expressed in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra passage discussed above (KA 4.6.9) , where possession and suci deśa were regarded as alternative conditions for ownership. It is therefore not possible to equate āgama and deśa -as Samozvancev did -since according to Indian law, possession without a legal title (whether proven or not) can never constitute ownership; and conversely, a title without possession can in certain circumstances result in the loss of the object and the right of ownership. In the same way, it is not possible to render āgama here as "document". With regard to this parallel, already Meyer observed:
Therefore the relation between deśa and āgama as revealed by the comparison of these passages can be explained as follows: Deśa signifies evidence that can prove or disprove the validity of a legal title, 13 whereas āgama signifies the title itself, characterized by the legal acquisition of the object. In case the title cannot be proven (but also not disproven) (= ucchinnadeśa, KA 3.16.29) , possession alone can constitute ownership.
Such an interpretation of deśa can be easily employed for other occurrences of this term in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra. And it seems also to be involved in Manu's rendering of the Arthaśāstra passage that contains this obscure term. A more careful reading of both parallel texts (Kauṭilīya and Manu) might give a hint on what Manu perceived as deśa. In the beginning of the passage he simply takes over the Arthaśāstra's text with deśa. But in the concluding part he seems to give a more specific explanation, when he says: These two sentences can be read as a paraphrase of the dictum in KA 3.1.19: pratijñāya deśaṃ nirdiśety ukte na nirdiśati He who promised evidence but when told "Produce it!" does not produce it … According to this parallel, deśa comprises the plaintiff's own testimony and the testimony of persons who are acquainted with the case (jñātāraḥ) 14 , i. e. witnesses. Manu is not the only Dharmaśāstra that contains verses that are obviously shaped on the basis of the Arthaśāstra text in question. These texts reveal different strategies of appropriation. While Manu preserved the original text and added an explanatory paraphrase, others replaced deśa by a more comprehensible term and thereby adapted the passage to their own terminology. Such a case is clearly represented by the verse preserved in the Mātkā 2 of the Nārada-Smr̥ti, a section which is only preserved in a part of the manuscript traditions, but which was also known to Asahāya, the earliest extant commentator on the Nārada-Smr̥ti (cf. Lariviere 1989,2: 229) . The verse is found in a passage that describes the general features of a lost case.
abhiyukto 'bhiyogasya yadi kuryād apahnavam / abhiyoktā diśed deśyaṃ pratyavaskandito na cet // Nār. Mātkā 2.26
If the accused denies the charge, the accuser has to prove the case, except when the accused demurs (tr. Lariviere 1989,2: 234). term deśa used in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra and in Manu 8.52-57. Rather, deśa regularly occurs in a context where we expect a rather general meaning "(point of) evidence, proof." Moreover, the term deśa is nowhere mentioned where we should defi nitely expect it if it were really designating a written document. Nor is any other term for "document" used in these passages: the chapters on vyavahāra in Manu and the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra do not contain any systematic treatment of documents as authoritative evidence, and documents are not even mentioned among the types of evidence used in the juridical procedure. Instead, both texts devote long passages on witnesses and their function in a process. 16 In order to reliably establish the semantic scope of the term deśa , it is therefore necessary to take into account the overall legal system as represented in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra. Narrowing down the meaning of deśa to "document" would raise several problems with regard to the integrity of the Arthaśāstra text and its legal system. These problems can be easily avoided by adopting the meaning "(point of) evidence, proof".
Such a general understanding is also the basis of the diff erent renderings of deśa and of passages in later Dharmaśāstra texts, such as the Nārada-Smr̥ti, the Yājñavalkya-Smr̥ti and the Br̥haspati-Smr̥ti, that probably originally contained this word. Although these texts are quite aware of the trividhapramāṇa principle and include long passages about written documents as legal authority in the juridical procedure, none of them substitutes or interprets deśa as "document."
Based on the evidence discussed here, the position of deśa with regard to the right of ownership as presented by these early texts can be represented as follows: Once the meaning "(point of) evidence, proof, indicium" is established, it is of course possible to replace this general term by more specific kinds of evidence. Hence a translation that substitutes "witness" -as some of Manu's commentators did -is not contradictory, if done in an isolated passage; and in the same way, translating this term as "document" does not really spoil the text. The same attitude can be observed in the case of the related generic term karaṇa, which some of Manu's commentators paraphrased by lekhyādi "documents, etc." (cf. Strauch 2002: 33-34) . However, given the overall context of the legal procedure as described by the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra and by Manu, such a translation seems to produce serious conflicts within the entire text.
Before revising our ideas about the development of Indian diplomatics and the role of written documents in the legal procedure of ancient India, it seems therefore advisable to look for further, more convincing evidence that could justify an interpretation of deśa as "document. For the time being, I suggest a return to the more cautious and more plausible explanation brought forward by Meyer, Kangle and Vigasin: deśa is one of the terms designating "(point of) evidence, proof" -a meaning that can be easily explained on etymological grounds (diś "indicate, show"), and can even be connected with the etymologically related Latin term indicium, used in legal terminology in the meaning "evidence".
